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INTRODUCTION: THE MORTGAGE MESS IS STILL THE PROBLEM
For six years now, the nation has been struggling with the fallout
of a residential real estate bubble and bust. From their 2006 highs,
housing prices are down nationally by 26.4%.1 In harder hit
communities, the figure is significantly higher. In Nevada, for
example, house prices remain 51.6% below their 2006 peak levels.2
This is notwithstanding continuing cyclical fluctuations pursuant to
which prices routinely rise in the summer only to plummet again

† Robert Hockett is Professor of Financial and International Economic Law at
Cornell Law School, Consulting Counsel at the International Monetary Fund, and recent
Resident Consultant at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He is also a Fellow of The
Century Foundation; commissioned author for the New America Foundation; regular
consultant to a number of domestic and international financial regulators and advocacy
groups, including Americans for Financial Reform; and occasional consultant to Mortgage
Resolution Partners, LLP, which is advancing a version of the plan advocated herein,
which Mr. Hockett has been pushing since mid-2008.
Thanks to Tobias Adrian, Mike Campbell, Bill Frey, Laurie Goodman, Howell
Jackson, Darius Kingsley, Chris Mayer, Jamie McAndrews, Meg McConnell, Rep. Brad
Miller, Sen. Don Riegle, Larry Rufrano, Bob Shiller, Joe Tracy, and other colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Department of
Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development for helpful comments in connection with this Essay. The views
here expressed are nevertheless solely my own and not attributable without confirmation
to anyone else named herein.
1 CORELOGIC, CORELOGIC HOME PRICE INDEX RISES BY ALMOST 10 PERCENT YEAR
OVER
YEAR
IN
JANUARY
2
(2013),
available
at
http://www.corelogic.com/research/hpi/january-2013-home-price-index-report.pdf.
2 Id.
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between annual ‘peaks.’3
The cyclical character of post-bust housing prices undercuts
occasional suggestions that the housing markets are ‘recovering.’
Non-seasonably adjusted Case-Shiller 20-city composite housing price
data compiled since July 2006 and represented below in Figure 1, for
example, indicate that the highest post-bubble price peak prior to
this past summer came not last year or the year before that, but in
July of 2010, while early 2012 saw the deepest post-bubble trough
since January 2009.4 After the recent 2012 seasonal peak, in turn,
prices again dropped in October and November. They then
recovered some of that loss in December and January, but remained
below their September seasonal peak.5 The point, then, should be
plain: short-term cyclical gains do not constitute ‘turnarounds.’ Longterm trajectories, which we can predict only partly by reference to
recent trends, while also by reference to causally relevant conditions,
are what matter. Millions of deeply underwater and accordingly atrisk mortgage loans are as causally relevant as can be. We would be
foolish, then, to view any one season’s price rises as indicia of ‘final
recovery,’ just as we would be to view one cooler summer as ‘disproof’
of climate change.
FIGURE 1

The numbers on the y-axis indicate S&P/Case-Schiller home price index
levels.

3 S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index Levels, S&P/CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE INDICES
(Standard
&
Poor’s,
Americas),
Mar.
26,
2013,
available
at
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/articles/en/us/?articleType=XLS&assetID=1
221192472066 (providing non-seasonably adjusted 20-city composite data); infra Figure 1
(presenting in graphical form the non-seasonably adjusted Case-Shiller Home Price Index
20-city composite data from July 2006 to January 2013).
4 See S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index Levels, supra note 3.
5 See id.
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Yet while inherently variable home equity values have fallen and
remain stubbornly low in relation to longer term trend, the fixed debt
obligations incurred by so many American homeowners during the
bubble years to buy homes—obligations that price-taking mortgagors
had to take on to afford home ownership under bubble conditions—
have of course not.6 The consequence is that nearly eleven million
mortgaged homes are now ‘underwater,’ market-valued at less than
the debts they secure.7 That is nearly a quarter of all American homes
with mortgages outstanding.8 Of these mortgaged homes, in turn,
upward of three million are already in default, in foreclosure, or
foreclosed and awaiting liquidation.9 Over two million Americans are
twelve months or more behind on their mortgages, meaning that
they are so delinquent as to be unlikely ever to catch up.10
The upshot of all of these figures, where public policy is
concerned, is that fewer than half of underwater home mortgage loans
are now current,11 while more go delinquent each month.12 Together
with loans that are already defaulted or delinquent, most housing
analysts expect between 7.5 million and 9.5 million additional homes to
go into liquidation over the next several years absent serious remedial
action.13 These homes would liquidate into an already depressed
market and would in turn create a backlog totaling approximately
200% of all annual existing home sales in the U.S. at current sales
paces.14 And we are not even halfway through our post-2006 housing

6 See Strengthening the Housing Market and Minimizing Losses to Taxpayers: Hearing Before
the S. Subcomm. on Hous., Transp. and Cmty. Dev., 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (statement of
Laurie S. Goodman, Senior Managing Director, Amherst Secs. Grp.), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=0f96e
0ff-8500-41a5-a0f2-0139d0df2e07 (estimating that between 7.4 and 9.3 million borrowers
had yet to face foreclosure and eventual liquidation, including between 2.4 and 3.3
million borrowers with excellent payment history but underwater mortgages) [hereinafter
Goodman Testimony].
7 CORELOGIC, CORELOGIC REPORTS 1.4 MILLION BORROWERS RETURNED TO
“POSITIVE EQUITY” YEAR TO DATE THROUGH THE END OF THE THIRD QUARTER 2012 1
(2013), available at http://www.corelogic.com/research/negative-equity/corelogic-q32012-negative-equity-report.pdf (“10.7 million, or 22 percent, of all residential properties
with a mortgage were in negative equity at the end of the third quarter of 2012.”).
8 Id.
9 See Goodman Testimony, supra note 6, at 1; Barry Ritholtz, Fascinating Mortgage &
Housing Data Points, THE BIG PICTURE (June 17, 2012, 9:38 AM),
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2012/06/fascinating-mortgage-housing-data-points/.
10 See Ritholtz, supra note 9.
11 See Goodman Testimony, supra note 6, at 1.
12 See id.
13 See, e.g., id. (estimating that there are between 7.4 and 9.3 million borrowers who
have “yet to face foreclosure and eventual liquidation.”).
14 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S
HOUSING
2
fig.1
(2012),
available
at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/son2012.pdf (estimating only
about 4 million existing home sales in 2012).
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‘correction.’
The flesh and blood fallout effects of these arid numbers are
devastating. Communities see their residents rendered homeless and
their property tax bases destroyed—ironically, just as abatement costs
wrought by foreclosed or abandoned properties skyrocket.15
Homeowners who are able to stay in their homes, for their part, not
only lose neighbors and endure all the blight and lost value
associated with empty and unmaintained neighboring homes but also
see essential services cut, school districts retrenching, and economies
shrinking—an aggregate monetized loss that is now estimated at $2
trillion.16
Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that
municipalities throughout the country—particularly those at the core
of our recent mortgage loan bubble and bust—are now filing for
bankruptcy.17
It is likewise unsurprising that the macroeconomy continues to
linger near Fisher-style, debt-deflationary slump—an economic
rendition of chronic fatigue syndrome with no resolution in sight. As
a recent Federal Reserve Board white paper and other sources
abundantly document, foreclosures and consequent slump in the
housing markets feed back into the broader economy by diminishing
wealth and consumer spending.18
That in turn lowers
macroeconomic growth and employment—bad enough in
themselves, yet also drawing more mortgages into the wave of

15 See Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local
Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 133–34 (2012).
16 See id. at 150; John W. Schoen, Foreclosure Fallout Cost Nearby Homeowners $2 Trillion,
Report Finds, NBCNEWS.COM: ECONOMY WATCH (Oct. 24, 2012), available at
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/economywatch/foreclosure-fallout-cost-nearbyhomeowners-2-trillion-report-finds-1C6663420.
17 See, e.g., Steven Church, Dawn McCarty & Michael Bathon, San Bernardino,
California, Files Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG.COM (Aug. 2, 2012, 7:38 PM), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-02/san-bernardino-california-files-forbankruptcy-protection-2-.html.
The municipalities mentioned in this Essay, San
Bernardino County, California and Wayne County, Michigan, will figure prominently
below as exemplars of American municipalities hit hard by the recent mortgage price
bubble and bust. See infra Part IV.
18 See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BD., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND
POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
3–4
(2012),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/housing-white-paper20120104.pdf (showing that decreases in home equity has significantly weakened
household spending and consumer confidence) [hereinafter U.S. HOUSING MARKET];
William C. Dudley, Housing and the Economic Recovery, Remarks at the New Jersey
Bankers
Association
Economic
Forum
(Jan.
6,
2012),
available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2012/dud120106.html
(explaining
that the decline in housing prices has created greater weakness in consumption and a
decreased ability to refinance which traditionally provided an important channel for
consumer spending).
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Hence the familiar self-worsening
delinquency and default.19
‘downward spiral’ or ‘holding pattern’ of high underwater loan and
foreclosure rates, which cause low growth and employment, which in
turn cause yet more default and foreclosure, and so on.20
Not all currently troubled mortgages, of course, are troubled by
virtue of their underwater status. Some homeowners, for example,
face difficulty keeping current on monthly mortgage payments simply
for reasons of temporary unemployment or underemployment,
stemming as radial effects from the broader underwater-mortgageinduced slump.21 For this class of mortgagor, the author and several
New York Fed colleagues have designed a Home Mortgage Bridge
Loan Assistance Program informed by a successful Pennsylvania
program put into place during the steel slump of the early 1980s.22 A
draft bill instituting the program, co-authored by the present author
and one of the aforementioned New York Fed colleagues, is happily
now under consideration in the state of New York.23
But even assuming successful enactment of the author’s draft
statute in New York and in other states, the nation’s far larger
problem will remain unaddressed. Temporary payment difficulties
associated with above-water mortgage loans are, after all, but a
miniscule part of the national mortgage problem.24 The key driver of

19 See Dudley, supra note 18; Hockett, supra note 15, at 134–35; Robert Hockett, Six
Years On and Still Counting: Sifting Through the Mortgage Mess, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 373,
374–75 ( 2013) .
20 See Hockett, supra note 19, at 374–75; see also Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective
Action Problems, J. APPLIED ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 13–15), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239849 (discussing credit-fueled
asset price busts and resulting debt deflation).
21 See James Orr et al., Help for Unemployed Borrowers: Lessons from the Pennsylvania Home
Owners’ Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program, CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN., April 2011,
at
1,
available
at
http://newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci172.pdfhttp://newyorkfed.org/resear
ch/current_issues/ci17-2.html.
22 See id. at 2–9 (detailing and explaining the mortgage bridge loan assistance
programs).
23 See NEW YORK CITY BAR COMMITTEE ON BANKING LAW, PROPOSAL TO ADOPT THE
HOME MORTGAGE BRIDGE LOAN PROGRAM 16–28 (2012), available at
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/9_20072233BridgeLoanAssistanceProgram.pdf (urging adoption of the Act and reproducing the text
of the Act in its entirety).
24 Cf. Michael V. Campbell & Robert C. Hockett, Some Homeowners Need Just Temporary
Aid,
AMERICAN
BANKER
(May
24,
2012,
10:59AM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Mortgage-bridge-loan-New-York-City-Bar1049605-1.html (noting that although some mortgages are in default due to temporary
slump-induced unemployment, others are simply poorly underwritten and structured
loans); Robert Hockett & Michael V. Campbell, A Bridge to Viable Mortgages,
(June
14,
2012,
8:36PM),
TIMESUNION.COM
http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/A-bridge-to-viable-mortgages-3635265.php
(arguing that mortgage problems caused by temporary causes have gotten little attention
because many distressed mortgages are structurally unsound, not just temporarily
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that story, again, is the large class of underwater mortgage loans
singled out above.
It is not hard to see why underwater mortgage loans would
account for the greater part of our troubles. Wrought by the long,
bubble-associated rise in housing prices that ended in 2006, the socalled ‘wealth effect’ supported growth-and-employment-maintaining
consumer demand even when wages and salaries rose only slightly or
stagnated.25 But the ‘effect’ runs both ways: homeowners with
‘negative equity’ after the bust cut their spending the most, even
before defaulting and foreclosing.26 Even tax cuts, rather than
flowing
mainly
toward
employment-supportive
consumer
expenditures, go largely toward trimming back overhung debt for
this class of mortgagor.27 That might explain why the 2009 fiscal
stimulus, tax-cut-laden as it was, did less than was hoped.28
Now matters appear to be bound to continue as they are—
worryingly reminiscent of Japan’s two (and still counting) post-crash
‘lost decades’—until mortgage debt overhang is pared back.29
Interest-reduction and term-extension will not suffice; the overhang is
the problem.30 But overhang can be trimmed in only one or both of
two ways: (1) inducing a rise in home prices back toward their bubble
year highs, and (2) writing-down debts toward their associated postbust collateral values. Since a return to bubble era home prices
seems neither feasible nor desirable, debt-reduction will have to be
part of any bona fide move forward.
I
PRINCIPAL WRITE-DOWNS ARE STILL THE SOLUTION
In light of the foregoing facts, it is now widely appreciated that
troubled).
25 See Dudley, supra note 18 (describing the ways in which a strong housing market
supports economic growth); Hockett, supra note 15, at 127–36.
26 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 134–35. But see Jennifer Robison, Local Spending is Up,
May Be Linked to Mortgage Delinquencies, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Oct. 21, 2012, 7:53AM),
http://www.lvrj.com/business/local-spending-is-up-may-be-linked-to-mortgagedelinquencies-175130981.html (documenting consumer expenditure boosts once
mortgage payments drop).
27 See Robert Hockett et al., The Way Forward: Moving from the Post-Bubble, Post-Bust
Economy to Renewed Growth and Competitiveness 16 (Cornell Legal Studies, Research Paper
No.
12-01,
2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987139.
28 See Michael Grabell, Op-Ed., How Not to Revive an Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2012, at SR8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/opinion/sunday/howthe-stimulus-fell-short.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
29 See ROBERT KUTTNER, A PRESIDENCY IN PERIL 66–68 (2010) (describing Japan’s
folly in the 1980s).
30 See Hockett et al., supra note 27, at 4. See also Goodman Testimony, supra note 6, at 1
(advocating for principal reduction modification as a means of reducing debt and
strengthening the housing market).
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principal write-downs must be done on a broad swath of underwater
mortgage loans.31 Debt loss will have to be formally recognized in a
manner commensurate with fair-value-accounted equity loss. Even
many creditors—the prospective first bearers of write-down-wrought
losses—understand and embrace this hard truth.32 Write-downs are,
after all, preferable to defaults, which plague underwater mortgages
at ominously high rates—rates we will soon see in more numbers.
Indeed, for much underwater mortgage debt, principal write-downs
actually maximize value.33 We find evidence for this in the rates at
which portfolio mortgage loan holders, as distinguished crucially—in
ways the author will explain—from securitization trusts, write down
debt.34
Write-downs, then, will have to be done—both to salvage value
for creditors and to trim macroeconomy-crippling mortgage debt
overhang for homeowners and their communities. The only question
is how. The answer at present, alas, depends tragically upon whether
the loans in question are held in bank portfolios or by securitization
trusts. In the former case, write-downs are already occurring at
significant and still increasing rates, while in the latter they are not.35
Why? Because bank officers know that underwater loans default
at high rates, meaning that the expected values of such loans fall
needlessly far short of their face values.36 It is accordingly rational for
banks to write down such loans. In so doing, the banks benefit not
only themselves but also their debtors and the communities in which
those debtors reside. It is a case of convergent interests —of ‘win-winwin’—though even here we can ‘win’ a lot more.37
II
WHY WRITE-DOWNS REMAIN RARE: SUICIDE PACT CONTRACTS AND
CREDITOR COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS
What about securitized mortgage loans? How and why do they
31 See Hockett et al., supra note 27, at 4–7; U.S. HOUSING MARKET, supra note 18, at
17, 20–21.
32 See Goodman Testimony, supra note 6, at 4–7.
33 Id.
34 See infra Part II.
35 See Dawn Kopecki & Michael J. Moore, JPMorgan, Wells Fargo Write Down HomeEquity Loans, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1012/occ-forced-jpmorgan-wells-fargo-to-write-down-home-equity-loans.html;
David
Streitfeld, Big Banks Easing Terms on Loans Deemed as Risks, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/business/03loans.html?_r=0.
36 See Kopecki & Moore, supra note 35.
37 See infra Parts V–VI. This is true because, as we shall see, the externalities
connected with price races give rise to a ‘last mover advantage,’ so that even portfolio
loans are modified at suboptimally low rates, with many banks waiting for others to
modify—or for some other price-raising ‘miracle’—to occur first. See Hockett, supra note
15, at 138–49.

62

CORNELL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol.98:55

differ from portfolio loans? Unfortunately, a host of classic collective
action problems stand in the way of the win-win solution in this case.38
For one thing, there is a last-mover advantage where write-downs
are concerned, owing to the positive externalities on later loans
wrought by most write-downs on earlier loans.39 Of course, this
particular challenge confronts portfolio loans too and therefore
keeps modification rates lower than they likely would otherwise be
even among banks.40 A battery of additional challenges in the case of
securitized loans, however, reinforces portfolio loans’ relative
advantage.
Most decisive among the additional challenges facing securitized
loans is contract rigidity. The problem is that many of the pooling
and servicing agreements (PSAs) pursuant to which most loans are
securitized, drafted during the bubble years when few foresaw the
prospect of an economy-wide housing price crash and many rushed
to push or to purchase exotic new mortgage products, require
unanimity or supermajority assent among mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) holders before loans can be modified within or sold out of
trusts.41 The problem that this poses is that fragmented owners of
MBS cannot even find one another, much less negotiate with
borrowers or would-be buyers and then reach agreement on what is
best for all. Making matters yet worse, the same agreements likewise
prohibit or otherwise prevent even trustees and loan servicers, who
are duty-bound to act on behalf of the MBS holders and hence could
in theory address the owners’ collective action problems, from
modifying or selling bad loans in sufficient numbers.42
But there is more. Many underwater homes also are subject to
second liens that secure home equity lines of credit (HELOCs), taken
out by mortgagors to supplement stagnating incomes during the
housing boom years.
First lienholders do not benefit from

38 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 138–40 (providing background and more detail
regarding the phenomena discussed in the following paragraphs); see also Robert J.
Shiller, Reviving Real Estate Requires Collective Action, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2012, at BU6,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/business/economy/real-estatescollective-action-problem.html (endorsing the analysis and plan presented in Hockett,
supra note 15).
39 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 138–42.
40 See id. at 142. The solution offered here might also be put to good use in
connection with some portfolio loans even though it is most dramatically called for in the
case of PLS loans. See infra Parts V–VI.
41 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 139–40.
42 See id. In some cases, for example, PSAs allow no more that 5% of loans in the
pool to be modified—a percentage that both reflects how little anticipation there was of
across-the-board crash and has long since been reached in the case of most loan pools. See
id.; Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Federal Home Mortgage Modification Efforts During the
Financial Crisis 22–23 (Harvard University Joint Center for Hous. Studies, Working Paper
MF10-6, 2010).
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modifications unless second lienholders modify, and hence are
pecuniarily disinclined to modify on their own. But many second
lienholders, for their part, feel less pressure to modify. The reason is
that borrowers in need of liquidity after the bust tend to ‘prioritize’
their sole remaining sources of revolving credit—their HELOCs—
and accordingly pay their second lienholders first. These payments
effectively reverse the legal order of creditor priorities between firsts
and seconds.43 To add insult to injury, the second lienholders also
quite often are banks—the same banks that service the first-liensecured loans. This arrangement of course poses a formidable
conflict of interest that further obstructs value-salvaging agreements
among creditors.44
There are additional obstacles to creditor-benefiting
coordination. Among them are bankruptcy law inapplicability as well
as Internal Revenue Code and Trust Indenture Act uncertainties.45
But the impediments already mentioned are enough to indicate how
forbidding the obstacles to voluntary principal write-downs that
would benefit creditors, debtors, and communities can be—
particularly for loans held in private label securitization (PLS) trusts,
which do not benefit from any explicit or implicit federal guarantee.
III
COLLECTIVE AGENCY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, TAKE ONE: FEDERAL
FAILURES
What then to do? Well, to solve a collective action problem or
cluster of the same, we require a collective agent.46 PLS trustees and
loan servicers of the sort we just noted typically play this role. But as
discussed above, in the case of most PLS loans, these individuals are
all either hand-tied, conflicted, or both. Who then is left to act for
the creditors and, by extension, the homeowners and spillover victims
of local foreclosures and national slump?
As it happens, governments and their instrumentalities are
collective agents too.47 And in this context they are collective actions
par excellence. For governments are the sole entities capable of
sidestepping PSA contract rigidities of the sort that now stand in the
way of broad principal write-downs for PLS loans. But which

43 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 142. But see Donghoon Lee et al., A New Look at
Second Liens, 569 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS 1 (2012), available
at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr569.html (indicating that the
second-mortgage-secured HELOC problem might not be as significant, empirically, as one
might expect it in theory to be).
44 See Goodman Testimony, supra note 6, at 3.
45 See Hockett, supra note 19, at 391–93.
46 See Hockett, supra note 20 (manuscript at 15–16).
47 See id. at 15.
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government should take up this mantle. Should we be focusing on
federal, state, or local governmental units?
In 2008, this author and two other academics separately
advocated federal action under a specific legal authority to which we
shall presently turn.48 In 2010, higher-profile policy advocates,
members of Congress, and other government figures added their
voices to the call.49 But for a number of reasons, our federal
government does not seem to be up to the task, nor does it appear
likely to reach that point anytime soon.
For one thing, the flagship federal Home Affordable Mortgage
Program (HAMP) does not prioritize write-downs, and neither the
present Congress nor any foreseeable future Congress are likely to
change this.50 When HAMP is used for write-downs, moreover, it
operates simply by paying the servicers, just as it does for all forms of
modification. It seeks to ‘bribe’ servicers with taxpayer money, in
other words, paying creditors to do what already creates value for
those creditors.51 More importantly, it offers no means of getting round
PSA-rooted restrictions on servicer action.52 These issues render HAMP
both irrelevant to PSA-hamstrung servicers and needlessly costly to
public coffers—all while ‘austerity hawks’ and others constantly
remind us that we live in tight times.
The government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac—are for their parts steered clear of loan writedowns by their regulator and current conservator, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).53 The latter is, thanks to its
current acting director, hostile to principal reduction as a matter of
(as it happens, inapplicable) principle and would in any event write
down principal at unnecessary cost through HAMP even if its acting
director did not oppose the idea. Indeed, the acting director of

48 See Robert C. Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-ins, and Ballyhoo, 52 CHALLENGE 36, 36–37
(2009) (elaborating more fully on this argument and proposals made by the author in
several op-eds over the autumn of 2008); Howell E. Jackson, Build a Better Bailout,
SCI.
MONITOR
(Sept.
25,
2008),
available
at
CHRISTIAN
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/0925/p09s02-coop.html
(arguing for alternatives such as the government purchasing actual loans); Lauren E.
Willis, Stabilize Home Mortgage Borrowers, and the Financial System Will Follow 1–2 (Loyola-LA
Legal
Studies,
Working
Paper
No.
2008-28,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1273268 (discussing government
action such as eminent domain to solve issues with the current financial system).
49 See KUTTNER, supra note 29, at 55–87; Brad Miller, UnHAMPered, NEW REPUBLIC,
Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/unhampered#.
50 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 143–45.
51 Id. at 146–47.
52 See id.
53 See Binyamin Appelbaum, U.S. Agency Bars a Plan to Reduce Home Debt, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/business/usagency-bars-fannie-and-freddie-from-reducing-principal.html.
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FHFA factors HAMP fees into his cost-benefit analysis of possible GSE
write-downs, thereby stacking the deck further against forward
movement involving GSE-held mortgage loans.54
Finally, because Congress has twice attempted and failed to
include mortgaged homes in the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy
judges are unable to employ their equitable powers to salvage value
among home mortgagors and mortgagees—unless, perhaps, millions
of underwater homeowners take up a ‘lease swap’ proposal made by
the present author in 2011, which does not look likely.55 Again, then,
neither this federal failure nor similar failures with respect to any
other hypothetical legislation is likely to be reversed in the
foreseeable future given the state of continuing paralysis in our
divided federal government. So no federal instrumentality appears
presently equipped to do sorely needed, value-recouping write-downs
on mortgage loan debt or apt to become thus equipped in the near
future.
What are the consequences of these failures? In the year from
September 30, 2011 to September 30, 2012, during which rates of
principal reduction were increasing, only 58,549 underwater home
mortgage loans saw principal write-downs.56 From the beginning of
2008 through the end of the second quarter of 2012, moreover, only
about 2.7 million loans were modified in any way by their servicers,57
while approximately 40% of these modifications reduced monthly
payments by less than 10%.58 All of this is the case notwithstanding
abundant evidence, derived from portfolio loan-holders, that sizeable

54 See Edward DeMarco, Remarks at the Brookings Institution: Addressing the Weak
Housing Market: Is Principal Reduction the Answer? 17 (Apr. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/0410_housing_demarco.aspx;
Letter
from
Edward DeMarco, Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, to
Congressman Elijah Cummings, Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform (Jan. 20, 2012) (on file with author).
55 See Hockett, supra note 19, at 391–92. For a description of the ‘lease swap’
proposal, see Robert Hockett, How About Home Lease Swapping as a Mortgage Market Cure?,
FIN.
NEWS
(Oct.
14,
2011,
3:01
PM),
BENZINGA
http://www.benzinga.com/news/11/10/1987688/how-about-home-lease-swapping-as-amortgage-market-cure; Robert Hockett, Post by Bob Hockett: ‘Lease Swaps’ as Mortgage Market
Cure, DORF ON LAW (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/10/post-by-bobhockett-lease-swaps-as.html. For a defense of Robert Hockett's lease swap proposal, see
Lynn M. LoPucki, House Swaps: A Strategic Bankruptcy Solution to the Foreclosure Crisis, 112 U.
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2014) (manuscript at 17–52), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2230117##).
56 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC MORTGAGE METRICS
REPORT: DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL BANK AND FEDERAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATION MORTGAGE
LOAN
DATA,
THIRD
QUARTER
25
tbl.17
(2012),
available
at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publicationsreports/mortgage-metrics-2012/mortgage-metrics-q3-2012.pdf.
57 See id. at 6 tbl.2.
58 See id.
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write-downs do salvage sizeable value.59 And it is notwithstanding
equally compelling evidence, found in the GSEs’ SEC filings, that
underwater PLS loans that are not written down will default at
remarkably high rates. For 2006 vintage loans, for example,
approximately 71% of subprimes, 70% of option ARMs, 58% of
variable rate loans, and a surprising 40% even of garden variety fixed
rate mortgage loans will default.60
IV
COLLECTIVE AGENCY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, TAKE TWO: THE
MUNICIPAL EMINENT DOMAIN PLAN
If it is not trustees, servicers, or federal government
instrumentalities, then who is the proper collective agent equipped to
address the collective action problems that now prevent principal
write-downs? The answer has been right before our noses all along:
it is state and municipal governments, which (a) face the brunt of mass
foreclosure and all of the ills that these mass foreclosures bring more
directly than the federal government;61 and (b) have readily available
authority, under both state and federal statutory and constitutional
law, to address these emergencies just as directly. We shall turn to
the ‘how’ in due course, but first we shall elaborate somewhat on
both (a) and (b).
To start with the first point, although the underwater mortgage
debt overhang crisis is crippling our entire nation’s economy, the
worst of the problem is significantly localized in character. There are
some communities, for example, in which more than 80% of mortgage
loans are underwater.62 In some, moreover, the degree to which the
affected loans are underwater—or the quantum of ‘negative equity’—
is nothing short of remarkable. There are communities that have a
significant number of underwater mortgages with loan to value
(LTV) ratios greater than 200%.63
This figure is historically
unprecedented and affords at least some hint as to why some affected
59

See Goodman Testimony, supra note 6, at 4–6.
See FED. NAT’L MORTG. ASS’N, QUARTERLY REPORT (Form 10-Q) 111 (June 30,
2012), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annualresults/2012/q22012.pdf.
61 It is well known that Fannie and Freddie hold significant numbers of underwater
loans in their portfolios and would benefit by writing them down for reasons given infra
Part V, notwithstanding the misguided arguments to the contrary referenced supra in note
54.
62 See, e.g., The U.S. Housing Crisis: Where are Home Loans Underwater?, ZILLOW,
http://www.zillow.com/visuals/negative-equity (last visited Apr. 15, 2013) (inputting area
code 30294 on March 17, 2013, indicates 81% of homes are underwater in that area
code).
63 See, e.g., id. (inputting area code 30294 on March 17, 2013, indicates that there are
significantly more mortgages with LTV ratios higher than 200% than there are mortgages
at any other individual level of LTV displayed by Zillow).
60
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communities are willing to act even before the nation as a whole
might see fit to do so.
The following county-by-county map affords a telling, if
understated,64 summary overview of how localized the worst of the
nation’s underwater mortgage loan problem actually is:65
FIGURE 2
CoreLogic Negative Equity: Negative Equity Share by County

Source: CoreLogic Negative Equity Report, Q2 2012, Negative Equity Share

If for the sake of illustrative case study we now concentrate our
attention on two counties in two states that (a) appear to have been
targeted with particular intensity by subprime lenders during the
bubble years; and (b) have suffered accordingly since the bubble’s
burst—San Bernardino in California and Wayne County in
Michigan—the underwater figures and associated measures of poor
economic health are remarkably high.
In California, the figure is approximately two million underwater
homes, representing 29% of the total statewide.66 Housing prices
have decreased significantly over the past five years—27.3% for
California as a whole67 and 41.34% for the Riverside-San Bernardino-

64 The chart covers all underwater loans, hence it does not reflect distinctions
between high LTV and lower LTV ratios on such loans.
65 CORELOGIC, CORELOGIC REPORTS NUMBER OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES IN
NEGATIVE EQUITY DECREASES AGAIN IN SECOND QUARTER OF 2012 5 (2012), available at
http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/researchtrends/asset_upload_file355_20017.pdf
[hereinafter 2012 Q2 Negative Equity Report].
66 Id. at 6.
67 Change in FHFA State House Price Indexes (Seasonally Adjusted, Purchase-Only Index,
HOUSING
FINANCE
AGENCY,
2012Q4),
FEDERAL
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=215&Type=summary (Mar. 17, 2013, 5:30 PM).
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Ontario area specifically.68 Unsurprisingly, San Bernardino also has
significantly higher unemployment and poverty rates than does the
nation as a whole. Its unemployment rate stands at 11.9% compared
to a national figure of 7.9%,69 while its estimated poverty rate stands
at 19.3% compared to a national figure of 15.9%.70 Scarce wonder,
then, that it is among the first municipalities in the nation to
consider a plan like the one on which we shall shortly elaborate.
Turning to Wayne County, Michigan—where Detroit is located—
the figures are again telling.
Approximately 450,000 homes,
representing a remarkable 32.8% of the total statewide, are under
water in Michigan.71 Home prices statewide are down 12.6% over the
past five years,72 while in Wayne County’s Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn
area the figure is 26.61%.73 As with San Bernardino, Wayne County
also shows similar disparities concerning indicators of economic
health: its unemployment rate is 11% compared to the nation’s
7.9%,74 while its estimated poverty rate is 25.9% compared to the
nation’s 15.9%.75
Yet as worrisome as all of these figures are, they are anything but
fully contained within these two illustrative counties. The cyclical
patterns we noted earlier for the nation as a whole carry over to our
worst hit states and their subdivisions as well.76 Meanwhile, a backlog
of over 195,000 homes in California, with approximately 17,300 in
San Bernardino alone, and over 60,000 homes in Michigan, with

68 Change in FHFA Metropolitan Area House Price Indexes (All Transactions Index,
2012Q4),
FEDERAL
HOUSING
FINANCE
AGENCY,
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=216&Type=summary (Mar. 17, 2013, 5:30 PM).
69 See Unemployment Rate by County, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/special/nation/unemployment-by-county/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (containing
interactive map that displays unemployment statistics for a county as selected by the user)
[hereinafter Unemployment Rate Chart].
70 See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY STATUS IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS:
2011 AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY 1-YEAR ESTIMATES,
available
at
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS
_11_1YR_S1701&prodType=table (allowing user to display reports on the national poverty
rate and poverty rates by county) (national and San Bernardino County reports on file
with author) [hereinafter Census Poverty Estimates].
71 See 2012 Q2 Negative Equity Report, supra note 65, at 6.
72 See Change in FHFA State House Price Indexes (Seasonally Adjusted, Purchase-Only Index,
2012Q4), supra note 67.
73 See Change in FHFA Metropolitan Area House Price Indexes (All Transactions Index,
2012Q4), supra note 68.
74 See Unemployment Rate Chart, supra note 69.
75 See Census Poverty Estimates, supra note 70 (national and Wayne County reports on
file with author).
76 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, SPOTLIGHT
ON THE HOUSING MARKET IN DETROIT-WARREN-LIVONIA, MICHIGAN MSA 2 (Jan. 2013),
available
at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=HUDJanRegSCSL_Detroit.pdf
(showing cyclical home price fluctuations for Detroit-Warren-Livonia, Michigan MSA).
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approximately 14,700 in Wayne County alone, are now either in
default, held in bank real estate owned (REO) portfolios or up for
post-foreclosure auction.77
So localities in many instances have significant incentives to
address the underwater mortgage loan problem in a decisive manner.
Under what authority, then, might they do so?
Here too the answer lies right under our noses, though lawyers
are apt to be first to detect it: using their traditional eminent domain
powers—a legal authority enshrined in our state and federal
constitutions for precisely such public exigencies as those that the
foreclosure crisis presents78—states or their counties can simply
purchase underwater mortgage loans from their holders at fair value,
sidestepping PSA contract rigidities in order to do what too many
PSAs presently prevent the loanholders and their fiduciaries from
doing. That is, again, to modify loans to render them payable. The
states or counties in question can then write down the loans to just
under the values of the underlying homes, bringing the homes at last
back above water. And voilà, the problem is solved in one elegant
stroke.79
If necessary, the same authority can also be used to take secondlien-secured loans at fair value, or even the liens that secure them
while leaving the notes with their holders, effectively converting the
latter into unsecured consumer debt. That prospect could do
wonders in bringing recalcitrant seconds to the table with firsts.
Eminent domain alone makes this approach possible—again, because
contract and holdup rigidities of this sort are precisely what
inherently flexible eminent domain authority is for. Eminent domain
enables political units to break through periodically emergent,
market-paralyzing contract rigidities or holdout abuses in the name
77

California
Real
Estate
Trends,
REALTYTRAC,
http://www.realtytrac.com/trendcenter/default.aspx?address=CA&parsed=1&stc=ca (last
visited Feb. 25, 2013) (showing foreclosure trend data for the State of California); San
Bernardino
County,
CA
Real
Estate
Trends,
REALTYTRAC,
http://www.realtytrac.com/trendcenter/default.aspx?address=San%20Bernardino%20co
unty%2C%20CA&parsed=1&cn=san%20bernardino%20county&stc=ca (last visited Feb.
25, 2013) (showing foreclosure trend data for San Bernardino County); Michigan Real
Estate
Trends,
REALTYTRAC,
http://www.realtytrac.com/trendcenter/default.aspx?address=MI&parsed=1&stc=mi (last
visited Feb. 25, 2013) (displaying foreclosure trend data for State of Michigan);
Wayne
County,
MI
Real
Estate
Trends,
REALTYTRAC,
http://www.realtytrac.com/trendcenter/default.aspx?address=Wayne%20county%2C%20
MI&parsed=1&cn=wayne%20county&stc=mi (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (displaying
foreclosure trend data for Wayne County).
78 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4 (providing the federal constitutional basis for
eminent domain in stating “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation”).
79 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 162–70 (providing a fuller schematization of this
plan).
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of us all.
But how are municipalities to purchase the loans or the liens,
given that states and their subdivisions are even more strapped for
cash these days than the federal government? Here too the answer is
simple. Municipalities can finance the purchases with monies
supplied by private sector investors, thereby avoiding all cost to the
public fisc. Investors can then be repaid from the proceeds of
refinanced loans, or in the form of bonds issued against pools of the
new, modified, and accordingly more valuable loans. In this
connection, crucially, the mentioned investors can and indeed
should include current bondholders themselves, who can receive rights of
first refusal to participate before any other investors are invited in.
This inclusion will underscore the sense in which the eminent
domain plan is meant simply to solve a collective action problem that
dysfunctional PSAs now prevent trustees and servicers from solving
themselves on behalf of their bondholding PLS trust beneficiaries.
It is instructive to note that by working with the municipalities in
the described manner, current bondholders will in effect piggyback
on governmental authority to sidestep market-failure-causing
dysfunctional contracts (the PSAs), and in so doing will at last get
past those contract rigidities that currently prevent them from writing
down principal and maximizing value on significantly underwater
loans, just as the portfolio loan holders, unhampered by
dysfunctional PSAs, are doing.
To note that bondholders will effectively be ‘paying themselves’
less than face value for their loans is just a roundabout way of saying
that they will be writing down principal. Again, that is something
which value-maximizing investors or their fiduciaries would do on
their own if PSAs did not render such action legally impossible absent
governmental exercise of contract-rescission authority through its
eminent domain power. Write-downs on deeply underwater loans
boost the values of those loans by eliminating most of the very high
default risk that otherwise afflicts them.
In sum, then, the plan as schematically rendered looks like the
figure below (single-headed arrows should be followed
counterclockwise beginning at the upper left; double-headed arrow
symbolizes identity or overlap between linked classes):
FIGURE 3
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Investors, including current bondholders, convey funds to trusts
or accounts organized and maintained by municipalities. The latter
then use the funds to purchase deeply underwater loans with high
default risk from current PLS trusts while continuing to pay out to
their bondholder beneficiaries. The municipalities then work with
homeowners to modify the bad loans on which they owe and that the
municipalities now hold. Once the modifications are completed, the
new loans are conveyed to the first-mentioned trusts, which convey
resultant funds to the first-mentioned investors just as the PLS trusts
do to their own beneficiaries. This is the plan in broad outline.
Of course, as the words ‘schematic’ and ‘broad outline’ suggest,
this diagram shows only the basic structure of the plan. More detail
will have to be supplied, on a locality-by-locality basis, to render such
a plan operational in any particular community. Among the required
further detail will be (a) selecting and preliminarily valuing the
appropriate underwater loans; (b) approaching and securing the
involvement of the investors; (c) commencing and conducting the
legal proceedings pursuant to which eminent domain authority is
actually exercised; (d) actually restructuring and perhaps
resecuritizing the loans once they are purchased; (e) working with
homeowners in connection with the foregoing; and (f) ultimately
compensating the investors once the process is completed, among
other things. Moreover, effective discharge of these functions will
require significant legal, financial, and counseling expertise. Yet this
can all be had and done, as the author has detailed elsewhere and as
municipalities are already considering.80
V
THE PLAN IS LEGAL: FAIR VALUE AND PUBLIC PURPOSE
But does this sort of thing actually occur, legally speaking? In
other words, does the government really use eminent domain for
more than just compulsory land purchases for the building of public
infrastructure?
Once again, the answer is straight-forwardly yes.81 Although nonlawyers are not as immediately aware of the fact as are lawyers, cities
compulsorily purchase property for public use at fair market value all
of the time, and they do so with all manner of property—tangible and

80 See, e.g., Eleazar David Melendez, Brockton, Massachusetts, Considers Eminent Domain
to Address Foreclosures, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2013, 2:19 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/11/brockton-eminent-domainforeclosure_n_2458369.html (last updated Jan. 15, 2013). The author is also serving as a
consultant for a number of cities considering the plan, but those cities’ identities are
presently confidential.
81 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 157–70 (providing a more thorough legal analysis
than the necessarily abbreviated one laid out in this Essay).
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intangible, contractual and real-estate-related alike.
Forms of intangible property analogous to mortgage loans that
have been purchased under eminent domain authority by states or
municipalities include bond tax exemption covenants,82 contract
rights,83 insurance policies,84 corporate equities,85 businesses as going
concerns,86 hunting rights,87 rights of way,88 and all manner of
additional intangible property—even sports franchises.89 Given that
the law does not distinguish between kinds of property that can be
compulsorily purchased in eminent domain proceedings, it should
come as no surprise that loans and liens in particular, as merely one
form of contractual obligation among many, all of which can be
condemned in eminent domain, are regularly condemned.90 Among
those liens are mortgage loans and liens, as the U.S. Supreme Court
and other state courts have long recognized.91
The question, then, is not what kinds of property can be taken,
but only whether the government pays fair value and whether a
proper public purpose justifies the forced sale. Preventing a self82 See
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-242ee–12-424yy (2011), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/pub/chap208b.htm (containing innovative statutory
provision enacted to prevent bond covenants from draining revenues from the fisc of the
State of Connecticut by utilizing the State’s eminent domain power).
83 See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977) (“Contract
rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that
just compensation is paid.”).
84 See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577–79 (1934) (“Valid contracts are
property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a State or the United
States.”).
85 See, e.g., Offield v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 203 U.S. 372, 375–77
(1906) (holding condemnation of shares of railway stock valid under state statute).
86 See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 3–4, 7–8 (1949)
(holding that use of eminent domain where United States government sought to acquire
right to temporary use and occupancy of defendant's laundry to provide laundry and dry
cleaning service for members of the armed forces was justified).
87 See, e.g., Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238, 240–41 (5th Cir.
1967) (allowing condemnation of hunting rights via eminent domain).
88 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 407
(1912) (permitting condemnation of right of way for public use).
89 See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal. 1982) (reversing
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment against the city’s action to acquire by
eminent domain the property rights of a professional football team).
90 See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding that
interest income generated by certain account funds is private property belonging to the
owner of the principal for Takings Clause purposes); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 48–49 (1960) (taking of materialman’s lien); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 551–53
(1870).
91 See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596 (1935) (“If
a part of the mortgaged property were taken by eminent domain a mortgagee would
receive payment on a similar basis.”); W. Fertilizer & Cordage Co. v. City of Alliance, 504
N.W.2d 808, 816 (Neb. 1993) (holding that “a mortgagee’s lien on real estate is an
interest that may be subjected to a taking for a public purpose and, therefore, may be the
subject of an eminent domain proceeding”).
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amplifying tsunami of additional foreclosures, mass homelessness,
blighted property, lost revenue base, and ultimate retraction of
essential city services—in short, urban blight on a disastrous scale as is
now seen in San Bernardino, Detroit, and all too many additional
American cities—is widely recognized in the courts as the most
compelling of public purposes justifying use of eminent domain
authority.92
What about valuation then? How is ‘fair value’ determined?
Would municipalities have to purchase underwater loans at less than
fair market value in order to recoup sufficient margin to compensate
the investors—including the current bondholders themselves—who
put up the purchase money? The answers are again rather simple.
Let us address the two questions in turn.
As for how valuation would be managed, there is nothing
particularly recondite or mysterious here. For one thing, where MBS
associated with a particular pool of loans or with analogous pools
trade on public markets at a discount, imputation of counterpart
discounts to the underlying loans is arithmetically straightforward.
And let there be no mistake: PLS bonds are trading at very steep
discounts.93 Where the mentioned imputation methods are not
available owing to missing markets, orthodox discounted cashflow
methods are perfectly serviceable. As noted above, for example,
Fannie and Freddie, among other entities, publish expected default
rates for various classes of underwater PLS mortgage each year in
their SEC 10-Q filings.94 Recall that the default rate for 2006 vintage
subprimes is about 70%, while the default rate for even relatively safe
fixed-rates is 40%.95
Other loan types show default rates between these extremes.96
From such default rates—along with loan terms, recovery rates, and
discount rates—the calculation of net present values (NPVs) is a
straightforward exercise.
Our courts, which routinely hear
arguments about valuation in multiple contexts and can always
92 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473, 478–79 (2005). The Kelo
decision makes for a particularly interesting comparison. There, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld a taking of actual homes at fair market value from predominantly elderly residents
with significant non-monetizable sentimental attachments to the homes, then conveyed
them to Pfizer in the name of a particularly speculative claim that this would economically
revitalize the city of New London, Connecticut. Id. What is contemplated here, by
contrast, is a taking of underwater mortgage loans with no sentimental significance at
truly fair value, in the name of a much more plausible claim that this will, by addressing a
market failure, bring value to bondholders, homeowners, and wider communities alike.
93 See
Current
Markit
ABX.HE
Indicies,
MARKIT
(Mar.
25,
2013),
http://www.markit.com/en/products/data/indices/structured-finance-indices/abx/abxprices.page.
94 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
95 See id.
96 See id.
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impanel experts in such cases, will be equipped to oversee all that
transpires as required by law, ensuring procedural and substantive
fairness to all parties.
What about the putative need to bilk current investors to
compensate new ones? Would that not be unfair and undercut
claims of public purpose? This false concern is intimately bound up
with another canard, widely propagated by certain participants in the
securitization industry whose interests appear now to conflict with
those of bondholders, homeowners, and their communities alike, to
the effect that someone must ‘lose’ under the eminent domain plan
if anyone is to ‘win.’ Must we rob Peter to pay Paul?
The answer is once again no. The charge that eminent domain
proceedings must always represent a ‘zero sum game’ is simply false.
Literally everyone can win under the eminent domain solution if the
actual stakeholders think for themselves, examine the numbers, and
do not squander resources—as certain participants in the
securitization industry have (bluffingly) threatened will happen since
the summer of 201297—on pointless litigation, lobbying, or strongarming efforts.98
Key to understanding why the eminent domain solution can
benefit everyone is the notion, discussed above, of a needlessly
wasteful collective action problem.99 The solutions to such market
failures, by definition, recoup needless losses that can then be
distributed Solomonically over all stakeholders.
To elaborate briefly, collective action problems characterize
situations in which everyone experiences avoidable loss even when
each person acts rationally, precisely because of the ways in which
even rational actions can aggregate into dysfunctional outcomes
when not orchestrated through coordinating instrumentalities like
governments. Credit-fueled asset price bubbles and busts are classic
cases in point,100 as are monetary inflations,101 debt deflations,102
‘bums’ rushes,’103 and ‘commons tragedies.’104 Indeed, so was the
aforementioned credit-fueled housing price hyperinflation itself,

97 See Ben Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Fight Closely Watched by Other
Struggling Communities, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2012, 3:29 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/01/eminent-domainmortgages_n_1836710.html.
98 The author passionately believes these opposing claims to be bluffs. See infra Part
VI.
99 See supra Parts II–III.
100 See Hockett, supra note 15, at 138–42; Hockett, supra note 20 (manuscript at 12–
14).
101 See Hockett, supra note 20 (manuscript at 11–12).
102 See id. (manuscript at 14–15).
103 See id. (manuscript at 10–11).
104 See id. (manuscript at 2).
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which is why individuals like the present acting director of FHFA are
so terribly wrong in believing that ‘moral hazard’ is anything more
than a de minimis policy interest where our ongoing underwater
mortgage loan crisis is concerned.105
As noted above, the nation’s ongoing mortgage and hence
broader economic troubles are rooted in problems of precisely this
collective action variety. Indeed, they just are the bondholder
collective action problems described earlier. This is precisely where
the eminent domain solution enters the picture in a way that can
benefit literally everyone. Its sole significance is its enabling of a
collective agent other than the trustee or servicer, whom we found
earlier to be hamstrung, to sidestep those market-paralyzing
securitization contracts that private parties cannot sidestep. Eminent
domain then allows refinancing of debt so that markets can return to
doing what they normally do best: price goods efficiently and recoup
otherwise lost value. This recouped value—the surplus we gain by
surmounting those market failures that our collective action
problems and PSAs jointly constitute— then can benefit literally
everyone.
VI
THE PLAN IS WIN-WIN-. . . WIN: OF SURPLUS AND STAKEHOLDERS
Everyone? Yes—literally everyone can win if we do the thing
right. Consider the stakeholders class by class. Under the eminent
domain plan, current first lienholders receive fair market value for
presently illiquid, unmarketable assets. Insofar as they are among the
investors who finance the compulsory purchases and receive
refinanced and accordingly more valuable loans in return, they get a
desired outcome that dysfunctional PSA contracts now prevent. That
is, of course, higher valued mortgage loan assets brought higher by
modifications that PSAs presently prevent.106 They are also spared
the significant litigation and liquidation costs associated with
foreclosure.
Next, consider investors in the written-down loans as a class,
irrespective of whether they themselves are participating current
bondholders. These people for their part get modest returns on the
funds that they lend to pay first-lien-holding trusts.107 Those returns

105 See DeMarco, supra note 54 (detailing Acting FHFA Director Edward DeMarco’s
observations on the “moral hazard” issue); see also Hockett, supra note 15, at 142–49
(arguing for how readily principal-reduction plans can avoid “moral hazard” issues).
106 See supra Part III.
107 It is instructive to note how the two step process under the eminent domain plan,
pursuant to which an MBS holder first ‘pays herself’ for her loans and then holds more
valuable, modified loans, simply simulates in two steps the one step act, commonly taken
by portfolio loan holding banks, of writing down principal to increase a loan’s value. The
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stem from the value that is added by modification and consequent
default-risk-reduction. Since this value-addition is made possible by
eminent domain and the private funds used to pay the required
condemnation awards, it is fair and equitable for both to receive a
part of the surplus that is generated. And so they shall under optimal
renditions of the eminent domain plan.
Now consider the underwater homeowners, who had no choice but
to pay bubble-determined prices for their homes during the bubble
years and are no more responsible for the bust or for failure to
foresee the bust than the lenders and securitizers—indeed they are
likely less responsible. This constituency now will receive an
increment of positive home equity and sustainable debt loads, their
piece of the refinance-generated surplus. They will also be enabled
to stay in their homes, which is itself ultimately an incalculable
benefit.
It should also be noted that neighbors and municipalities will finally
stop losing home values and revenue bases, and everyone now suffering
related forms of spillover loss thanks to our ongoing balance sheet
recession will finally see real recovery.
That will be these
constituencies’ piece of the surplus—or perhaps better put, this will
be the positive externality that at last reverses the currently negative
externalities that afflict them.
Finally, consider the second lienholders. Even they can benefit if
paid sweeteners out of the value recouped by the write-downs
effected through eminent domain, since in foreclosure—which,
again, is overwhelmingly likely where mortgage debt is severely
underwater—they get nothing. Through the eminent domain plan,
by contrast, all that the seconds stand to lose is the holdup power that
some of them wield illegitimately owing to mortgagor liquidity
needs—a power that, again, harms those first lienholders who legally
stand ahead of them in the bankruptcy queue.108 This ‘loss’ is no
more a policy-cognizable loss than any other loss of an ill-gotten,
illegitimate gain.
In the end, then, literally everyone can win under the eminent
domain solution because it recoups presently lost value that can be
equitably distributed.
CONCLUSION: IT TAKES A VILLAGE
It is to be hoped, then, in light of the foregoing, that all might
help all now by acting to salvage lost value. As elaborated above, our

reason for the second step in the PLS case is the PSAs, in which contracts require the
interpolation of a step taken by government—the sole entity able to abrogate contracts—
in order to effect what could otherwise be done in one step by a private party.
108 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
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continuing mortgage debt crisis is enormous in magnitude. Many
millions are directly affected, and scores of millions more suffer the
ravages of that broader slump which the mortgage mess underwrites.
Tragically, all of this is completely unnecessary, the product of no more
than a structural problem that blocks us from doing what is best for
everyone.
What is best for everyone at this point is for creditors and
debtors in the securitized residential real estate market to write down
debt as those in the non-securitized market do. All that stands in
their way are certain improvidently formulated contracts drafted
when few thought a nationwide real estate crash possible. Only the
public at large, through its governments, is legally able to get past
those contracts. And as this author hopes to have made plain, the
governments best situated to do that at present, it seems, are the local
ones.
Here, as in so much else, then, it takes something other than
individuals or federal agencies to break a tragic impasse. It takes
collective action at that level of government where the pain is felt
most. It takes, then, a village.

